Hume on the Generation of Motives: Why Beliefs Alone Never Motivate

Hume Studies 25 (1-2):101-122 (1999)
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Abstract

Hume’s thesis that reason alone does not motivate is taken as the ground for this theory: Reason produces beliefs only, and beliefs are mere representations of fact, which, without passions for the objects the beliefs concern, cannot move anyone at all. Discussions of the Humean theory of motivation usually begin with the motivating passions in place without asking about their genesis. This emphasis, I think, overlooks a good deal of what Hume’s thesis concerning the motivational impotence of reason is about: It concerns the incapacity of reason to generate the motivating passions in the first place, and not just the ineffectiveness of beliefs, without passions, to produce action. [...] In this paper, I will offer an interpretation of Hume's theory of motive formation and show how it provides crucial support for a famous claim in his argument against the moral rationalists[...]. As it turns out, reason does play a necessary role in motive formation even for Hume, but the answer why it is not sufficient is a telling difference between a rationalist moral psychology and Hume's.

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Citations of this work

Hume's emotivist theory of moral judgements.James Chamberlain - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):1058-1072.
Reconciling realism with humeanism.Terence Cuneo - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):465 – 486.
Moral motivation in early 18th century moral rationalism.Daniel Eggers - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):552-574.
Causal and Logical Necessity in Malebranche’s Occasionalism.A. R. J. Fisher - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):523-548.

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References found in this work

Is Hume a noncognitivist in the motivation argument?Rachel Cohon - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 85 (2-3):251-266.

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