Neuroscience and anna; a reply to Glenn Hartz

Philosophy 75 (3):437-440 (2000)
Glen Hartz argues, that neuroscience reveals that persons moved or frightened by fictional characters believe that they are real, so such behaviour is not irrational. But these beliefs, if they exist, are not rational and, in any case inconsistent with our conscious rational beliefs that fictional characters are not real. So his argument fails to establish that we are not irrational or incoherent when moved or frightened by such characters. It powerfully reinforces the contrary view.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0031819100000498
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 29,848
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Reply to Philip Beeley.Glenn A. Hartz - 2006 - The Leibniz Review 16:199-201.
Fictional Characters and Literary Practices.Amie L. Thomasson - 2003 - British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (2):138-157.
Rational Fear of Monsters.R. Joyce - 2000 - British Journal of Aesthetics 40 (2):209-224.
Leibniz's Phenomenalisms.Glenn A. Hartz - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (3):511-549.
Desire and Emotion in the Virtue Tradition.Glenn A. Hartz - 1990 - Philosophia 20 (1-2):145-165.
Liberalism in America: Hartz and His Critics.Sanford Lakoff - 2005 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 8 (1):5-30.
God, Free Will and Morality.Glenn A. Hartz - 1988 - International Studies in Philosophy 20 (3):140-141.
Added to PP index

Total downloads
43 ( #131,489 of 2,210,506 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #389,893 of 2,210,506 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature