Reason, Morality, and Hume’s “Active Principles”: Comments on Rachel Cohon’s Hume’s Morality: Feeling and Fabrication

Hume Studies 34 (2):267-276 (2008)
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Rachel Cohon's Hume is a moral sensing theorist, who holds both that moral qualities are mind-dependent and that there is such a thing as moral knowledge. He is an anti-rationalist about motivation, arguing that reason alone does not motivate, but allows that both beliefs and passions are motivating. And he is both a descriptive and a normative moral theorist who, despite having resources for putting checks on our sentimentally-based moral evaluations, does end up with a kind of a relativistic account of the virtues and vices. Professor Cohon's arguments in Hume's Morality1 are tight and vigorous. Anyone working on these .



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Causal and Logical Necessity in Malebranche’s Occasionalism.A. R. J. Fisher - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):523-548.
The inertness of reason and Hume’s legacy.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (S1):117-133.

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