Philosophical Studies 122 (2):189-202 (2005)

Authors
Diana Raffman
University of Toronto, Mississauga
Abstract
In their paper “Mary, Mary, Quite Contrary” , George Graham and Terence Horgan argue, contrary to a widespread view, that the socalled Knowledge Argument may after all pose a problem for certain materialist accounts of perceptual experience. I propose a reply to Graham and Horgan on the materialist’s behalf, making use of a distinction between knowing what it’s like to see something F and knowing how F things look
Keywords Experience  Knowledge  Materialism  Metaphysics  Perception  Zombie  Graham, G  Horgan, T
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Reprint years 2005
DOI 10.1007/s11098-004-9462-x
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References found in this work BETA

Mortal Questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.
Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
What Mary Didn't Know.Frank Jackson - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (5):291-295.

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Citations of this work BETA

Imagining, Recognizing and Discriminating: Reconsidering the Ability Hypothesis.Bence Nanay - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):699-717.
The Knowledge Argument and Objectivity.Robert J. Howell - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (2):145-177.
Mary Mary, Au Contraire: Reply to Raffman.George Graham & Terence Horgan - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (2):203-212.
Observational Concepts and Experience.Ivan V. Ivanov - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Warwick

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