Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (2):283-313 (2020)

Raidl Eric
University Tübingen
Fitelson and McCarthy have proposed an accuracy measure for confidence orders which favors probability measures and Dempster-Shafer belief functions as accounts of degrees of belief and excludes ranking functions. Their accuracy measure only penalizes mistakes in confidence comparisons. We propose an alternative accuracy measure that also rewards correct confidence comparisons. Thus we conform to both of William James’ maxims: “Believe truth! Shun error!” We combine the two maxims, penalties and rewards, into one criterion that we call prioritized accuracy optimization. That is, PAO punishes wrong comparisons and rewards right comparisons. And it requires to prioritize being right und avoiding to be wrong in a specific way. Thus PAO is both, a scoring rule and a decision rule. It turns out that precisely confidence orders representable by two-sided ranking functions satisfy PAO. The point is not to argue that PAO is the better accuracy goal. The point is only that ranking theory can also be supported by accuracy considerations. Thus, those considerations by themselves cannot decide about rational formats for degrees of belief, but are part and parcel of an overall normative assessment of those formats.
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-019-09518-8
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References found in this work BETA

Accuracy, Coherence, and Evidence.Branden Fitelson & Kenny Easwaran - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:61-96.
Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese. pp. 263-297.
The Will to Believe.W. James - 1897 - Philosophical Review 6:88.
A General Non-Probabilistic Theory of Inductive Reasoning.Wolfgang Spohn - 1990 - In R. D. Shachter, T. S. Levitt, J. Lemmer & L. N. Kanal (eds.), Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 4. Elsevier.

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