Bridging Ranking Theory and the Stability Theory of Belief

Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (6):577-609 (2017)

Authors
Niels Skovgaard-Olsen
Universität Göttingen
Raidl Eric
University Tübingen
Abstract
In this paper we compare Leitgeb’s stability theory of belief and Spohn’s ranking-theoretic account of belief. We discuss the two theories as solutions to the lottery paradox. To compare the two theories, we introduce a novel translation between ranking functions and probability functions. We draw some crucial consequences from this translation, in particular a new probabilistic belief notion. Based on this, we explore the logical relation between the two belief theories, showing that models of Leitgeb’s theory correspond to certain models of Spohn’s theory. The reverse is not true. Finally, we discuss how these results raise new questions in belief theory. In particular, we raise the question whether stability is rightly thought of as a property pertaining to belief.
Keywords Belief  Probability  Lottery Paradox  Stability Theory  Ranking Theory  Knowledge  Lockean Thesis  Odds-threshold
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2017
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s10992-016-9411-0
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 43,780
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Stability Theory of Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (2):131-171.
Reducing Belief Simpliciter to Degrees of Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2013 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (12):1338-1389.
Propositional Reasoning That Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning.Hanti Lin & Kevin Kelly - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):957-981.
Belief as Question‐Sensitive.Seth Yalcin - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):23-47.
I—The Humean Thesis on Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):143-185.

View all 7 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Full & Partial Belief.Konstantin Genin - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 437-498.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Belief Revision II: Ranking Theory.Franz Huber - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):613-621.
Ranking Functions, AGM Style.Wolfgang Spohn - 1999 - Internet Festschrift for Peter Gärdenfors.
A Survey of Ranking Theory.Wolfgang Spohn - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer.
Ranking Theory and Conditional Reasoning.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (4):848-880.
A Ranking‐Theoretic Approach to Conditionals.Wolfgang Spohn - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (6):1074-1106.
Conditional Ranking Revision.Emil Weydert - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):237-271.
Hume's Theory of Belief.Michael M. Gorman - 1993 - Hume Studies 19 (1):89-101.
Wolfgang Spohn and the Ranking Functions Theory.Stefano Bigliardi - 2010 - Rivista di Filosofia 101 (1):57-80.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-08-27

Total views
32 ( #266,862 of 2,265,042 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #449,910 of 2,265,042 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature