Collective and joint intention

Mind and Society 1 (2):39-69 (2000)
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Abstract

The paper discussed and analyzes collective and joint intentions of various strength. Thus there are subjectively shared collective intentions and intersubjectively shared collective intentions as well as collective intentions which are objectively and intersubjectively shared. The distinction between collective and private intentions is considered from several points of view. Especially, it is emphasized that collective intentions in the full sense are in the “we-mode”, whereas private intentions are in the “I-mode”. The paper also surveys recent discussion in the literature concerning the nature of collective and joint intention and defends the author's accounts against criticisms

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Author's Profile

Raimo Tuomela
Last affiliation: University of Helsinki

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References found in this work

Collective Intentions and Actions.John Searle - 1990 - In Philip R. Cohen Jerry Morgan & Martha Pollack (eds.), Intentions in Communication. MIT Press. pp. 401-415.
On Social Facts.Margaret Gilbert - 1989 - Ethics 102 (4):853-856.
Shared cooperative activity.Michael E. Bratman - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):327-341.
The importance of us: a philosophical study of basic social notions.Raimo Tuomela - 1995 - Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

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