Ethics 124 (4):813-859 (2014)

Peter Railton
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Intuition—spontaneous, nondeliberative assessment—has long been indispensable in theoretical and practical philosophy alike. Recent research by psychologists and experimental philosophers has challenged our understanding of the nature and authority of moral intuitions by tracing them to “fast,” “automatic,” “button-pushing” responses of the affective system. This view of the affective system contrasts with a growing body of research in affective neuroscience which suggests that it is instead a flexible learning system that generates and updates a multidimensional evaluative landscape to guide decision and action. With this latter view in mind, I revisit some of the classic hypothetical scenarios used in experimental moral psychology.
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DOI 10.1086/675876
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