Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):327-346 (2017)

Authors
Thomas Raleigh
United Arab Emirates University
Abstract
I present an argument against the thesis of Uniqueness and in favour of Permissivism. Counterexamples to Uniqueness are provided, based on ‘Safespot’ propositions – i.e. a proposition that is guaranteed to be true provided the subject adopts a certain attitude towards it. The argument relies on a plausible principle: (roughly stated) If S knows that her believing p would be a true belief, then it is rationally permitted for S to believe p. One motivation for denying this principle – viz. opposition to ‘epistemic consequentialism’ – is briefly discussed. The principle is extended to cover degrees of belief and compared with a couple of other well-known constraints on rational degrees of belief.
Keywords Uniqueness  Permissivism  Evidence  Rationality  Epistemology  Epistemic Consequentialism  Blindspot  Credence  Reflection  Principal Principle
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2017
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Upload history
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.
Epistemic Permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.

View all 25 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson & Margaret Greta Turnbull - forthcoming - In Clayton Littlejohn & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York: Routledge. pp. 1-13.
Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson & Bryan Frances - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Anti‐Reductionism and Expected Trust.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (4):952-970.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-08-09

Total views
216 ( #37,475 of 2,331,237 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
33 ( #18,704 of 2,331,237 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes