Another Argument Against Uniqueness

Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):327-346 (2017)
Abstract
I present an argument against the thesis of Uniqueness and in favour of Permissivism. Counterexamples to Uniqueness are provided, based on ‘Safespot’ propositions – i.e. a proposition that is guaranteed to be true provided the subject adopts a certain attitude towards it. The argument relies on a plausible principle: (roughly stated) If S knows that her believing p would be a true belief, then it is rationally permitted for S to believe p. One motivation for denying this principle – viz. opposition to ‘epistemic consequentialism’ – is briefly discussed. The principle is extended to cover degrees of belief and compared with a couple of other well-known constraints on rational degrees of belief.
Keywords Uniqueness  Permissivism  Evidence  Rationality  Epistemology  Epistemic Consequentialism  Blindspot  Credence  Reflection  Principal Principle
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2016-08-09

Total downloads
80 ( #75,415 of 2,237,285 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
14 ( #32,660 of 2,237,285 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature