Against an Inferentialist Dogma

Synthese 194 (4):1397-1421 (2017)
Authors
Thomas Raleigh
University of Antwerp
Abstract
I consider the ‘inferentialist’ thesis that whenever a mental state rationally justifies a belief it is in virtue of inferential relations holding between the contents of the two states. I suggest that no good argument has yet been given for the thesis. I focus in particular on Williamson (2000) and Ginsborg (2011) and show that neither provides us with a reason to deny the plausible idea that experience can provide non-inferential justification for belief. I finish by pointing out some theoretical costs and tensions associated with endorsing inferentialism.
Keywords Inferentialism  Justification  Epistemology  Perception  Perceptual Experience  Acquaintance  Non-inferential Justification
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Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-1002-z
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.R. Rorty - 1979 - Princeton University Press.
Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
The Contents of Visual Experience.Susannah Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.
Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
The Intellectual Given.John Bengson - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):707-760.

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