Phenomenal Privacy, Similarity and Communicability

Abstract
The idea that there are features of or in our conscious experience that are, in some important sense, private has both a long history in philosophy and a large measure of intuitive attraction. Once this idea is in place, it will be very natural to assume that one can think and judge about one’s own private features. And it is then only a small step to the idea that we might communicate such thoughts and judgements about our respective private features with each other.
Keywords Phenomenal Properties  Consciousness  Philosophy of Mind  Phenomenal Similarity  Wittgenstein  Other Minds  Natural Kinds  Private Language Argument  Sensation  Edward Craig
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DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0004.022
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