Phenomenology without Representation

European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):1209-1237 (2013)
Abstract
I criticise a recent variety of argument for the representational theory of experience, which holds that the very idea of perceptual experience entails the representational view. I argue that the representational view is not simply obvious, nor is it contained in the mere idea of the world looking some way. I also clarify and re-present an argument against the representational view due to Charles Travis.
Keywords Philosophy of Mind  Intentionalism  Phenomenology  Visual experience  Charles Travis  Representation  Experience  Philosophy of Psychology  Illusion
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DOI 10.1111/ejop.12047
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References found in this work BETA
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
Perceptual Content Defended.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.

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Citations of this work BETA
Why Do We Need Perceptual Content?Ayoob Shahmoradi - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):776-788.
Against an Inferentialist Dogma.Thomas Raleigh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1397-1421.
Illusions of Optimal Motion, Relationism, and Perceptual Content.Santiago Echeverri - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):146-173.

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