Some Endeavours at Synthesising a Solution to the Sorites

Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 3 (1) (1999)
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Abstract

‘Puzzles’, ‘word games’, ‘logical anomalies’, whatever we call them, they perplex us and challenge our familiar patterns of reasoning. One of these puzzles, among many others, originated from the mind of an ancient Megarian logician, Eubulides of Miletus, and endures to the modern day.1 Its name, ‘sorites’, can be traced to the Greek word soros, meaning ‘heap.’ The answer to whether one grain of sand ‘is a heap’ or ‘is not a heap’ seems quite simple: it is not a heap. However, as we add grains to the one, at what future point does the non-heap become a heap? Our decision is fraught with uncertainty. Are the objects or the language we are using to describe them vague? In academic philosophy, the ancient Greek puzzle has gained the status of a paradox, as philosophers apply stoic and modern logic to these propositions considered to have vague predicates. The current debate has developed quite serious and wide-ranging implications, such as whether sorites issues provide adequate grounds for abandoning our standard ontology (or our understanding of what really exists), 2 and (germinating into another discipline) whether vagueness in the language of legal rules can generate disagreement as to whether there are right answers to questions of law. 3 Several unique solutions to the paradox have been proposed, yet all suffer from specific inadequacies that might, upon further reflection, disappear in the event that we endeavour to produce a synthesis. When we say that we are attempting to derive a synthesis, we seek to combine elements of two solutions for the sake of creating a new (and hopefully, though not necessarily, a better) one. The paradox of the sorites, or ‘the heap’, appeals to us because it challenges our assumption that we may categorically describe clear cases and their negations, yet fail to distinguish the borderline ones. I will demonstrate that some combinations of solutions are easy fits while others are extremely weak and awkward as attempts at resolving the paradox. Nonetheless, the process of synthesis produces three noteworthy combinations.

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Shane Ralston
University of Ottawa (PhD)

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References found in this work

The Semantic Conception of Truth.Alfred Tarski - 2005-01-01 - In José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth. Blackwell.
Vagueness without paradox.Diana Raffman - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (1):41-74.
Two Issues of Vagueness.Stephen Schiffer - 1998 - The Monist 81 (2):193--214.
Gods and Heaps.M. F. Burnyeat - 1981 - In M. Nussbaum & M. Schofield (eds.), Language and Logos: Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to G. E. L. Owen. New York: Cambridge University Press.

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