Synthese (3):1-26 (2019)

Authors
Thomas Raleigh
University of Luxembourg
Abstract
A good account of the agnostic attitude of Suspending Judgement should explain how it can be rendered more or less rational/justified according to the state of one's evidence – and one's relation to that evidence. I argue that the attitude of suspending judgement whether p constitutively involves having a belief; roughly, a belief that one cannot yet tell whether or not p. I show that a theory of suspending that treats it as a sui generis attitude, wholly distinct from belief, struggles to account for how suspension of judgement can be rendered more or less rational (or irrational) by one's evidence. I also criticise the related idea that suspension essentially requires an 'Inquiring Attitude'. I show how a belief-based theory, in contrast, neatly accounts for the rational and epistemic features of suspending and so neatly accounts for why an agnostic has a genuine neutral opinion concerning the question whether p, as opposed to simply having no opinion.
Keywords Suspending Judgement  Agnosticism  Belief  Evidence  Rationality  Justification  Epistemic Normativity  Epistemology  Higher-Order Evidence  Propositional Attitudes
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Reprint years 2021
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-019-02223-8
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References found in this work BETA

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Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.

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Citations of this work BETA

Is higher-order evidence evidence?Eyal Tal - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3157-3175.
Rational Suspension.Alexandra Zinke - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1050-1066.
Agnosticism as Settled Indecision.Verena Wagner - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):671-697.
The Rationality of Eating Disorders.Stephen Gadsby - forthcoming - Mind and Language.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

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