Tolerant enactivist cognitive science

Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):226-244 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Enactivist (Embodied, Embedded, etc.) approaches in cognitive science and philosophy of mind are sometimes, though not always, conjoined with an anti-representational commitment. A weaker anti-representational claim is that ascribing representational content to internal/sub-personal processes is not compulsory when giving psychological explanations. A stronger anti-representational claim is that the very idea of ascribing representational content to internal/sub-personal processes is a theoretical confusion. This paper criticises some of the arguments made by Hutto & Myin (2013, 2017) for the stronger anti-representational claim and suggests that the default Enactivist view should be the weaker non-representational position.

Other Versions

No versions found

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-05-27

Downloads
961 (#18,653)

6 months
133 (#34,146)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Thomas Raleigh
University of Luxembourg

Citations of this work

The given and the hard problem of content.Pietro Salis - 2024 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 23 (4):797-821.
Cognitive Instrumentalism about Mental Representations.Samuel D. Taylor - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (3):518-550.

Add more citations