Understanding How Experience "seems"

European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2):67-78 (2009)
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Abstract

I argue against one way of understanding the claim that how one’s visual experience “seems” provides support for the naïve-realist theory and weighs against sense-data theories . If my argument is correct, and we abandon this way of understanding how experience “seems”, we would lose one reason for favouring naïve-realism at the start of the dialectic of the traditional problem of perception. En route, I distinguish diff erent ways of understanding the transparency of experience, consider how to make sense of rival theorists’ disagreement over the manifest nature of visual phenomenology and recount a story about Wittgenstein

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Thomas Raleigh
University of Luxembourg

Citations of this work

Science, substance and spatial appearances.Thomas Raleigh - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2097-2114.

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References found in this work

Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
Perception and content.Bill Brewer - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):165-181.

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