Disputatio 4 (30):69-91 (2011)
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Abstract |
I raise a problem for common-factor theories of experience concerning the
demonstrative thoughts we form on the basis of experience. Building on an
insight of Paul Snowdon 1992, I argue that in order to demonstratively refer to an item via conscious awareness of a distinct intermediary the subject must have some understanding that she is aware of a distinct intermediary.
This becomes an issue for common-factor theories insofar as it is also widely accepted that the general, pre-philosophical or ‘naïve’ view of experience does not accept that in normal perceptual cases one is consciously aware of non-environmental (inner, mental) features. I argue then that the standard common-factor view of experience should be committed to attributing quite widespread referential errors or failures amongst the general, nonphilosophical populace – which seems an unattractively radical commitment.
After clarifying the various assumptions I am making about experience
and demonstrative thoughts, I consider a number of possible responses
on behalf of the common-factor theorist. I finish by arguing that my argument should apply to any common-factor theory, not just avowedly ‘indirect' theories.
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Keywords | Visual experience Demonstrative thought Demonstrative reference Common-factor Intentionalism Paul Snowdon Conscious experience |
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DOI | 10.2478/disp-2011-0005 |
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References found in this work BETA
Reference and Definite Descriptions.Keith S. Donnellan - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.
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Citations of this work BETA
Naïve Realism and the Conception of Hallucination as Non-Sensory Phenomena.Takuya Niikawa - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (46):353-381.
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