Against anti-explanation

Cinta de Moebio 71:109-123 (2021)
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Abstract

Resumen: La contingencia de los fenómenos sociales y políticos ha sido abordada por diversas teorías contemporáneas. El tema circula en la sociología histórica, la teoría de sistemas de Luhmann, el institucionalismo histórico, la historia contrafáctica o el posmarxismo, asociado, entre otras, al carácter disruptivo y abrupto de ciertos procesos históricos, al cruce de series causales inicialmente independientes, a la inconsistencia de todo orden, a la coexistencia de mundos posibles o a la electividad asociada a la agencia. Como parte de esa constelación, y de la mano de un estudio de caso, el sociólogo Charles Kurzman habla de “anti-explicación”. Su propósito no es solo cuestionar, sobre esa base, cualquier afán predictivo de las ciencias sociales, sino la posibilidad misma de analizar causalmente fenómenos contingentes como las revoluciones y los movimientos sociales. El texto busca desarrollar un contraargumento a esta tesis, moviéndose en el doble plano en el que opera Kurzman y mostrando, a la vez, su filiación y resonancia con posturas posmarxistas. Pretendiendo integrar la contingencia en la explicación del tipo de fenómenos mencionados, se recurre para ello a conceptos como causación descendente, catalizadores, bucles complejos y mecanismos causales.: The contingency of social and political phenomena has been addressed by various contemporary theories. The topic circulates in historical sociology, Luhmann's system theory, historical institutionalism, counterfactual history, or post-Marxism, associated, among others, to the disruptive and abrupt character of certain historical processes, the cross points of initially independent causal series, the inconsistency of all order, the coexistence of possible worlds or the electivity associated with the agency. As part of that constellation, and along with a case study, the sociologist Charles Kurzman speaks of the “anti-explanation”. The purpose of such is not just to question, on that basis, any predictive haste of the social sciences, but the very possibility of causally analyzing contingent phenomena such as revolutions and social movements. The text seeks to develop a counterargument to this thesis, moving along the epistemological and historical-social double plane in which Kurzman operates and showing, at the same time, its filiation and resonance with post-Marxist positions. With the purpose of integrating the contingency with the explanation of the type of phenomena mentioned, concepts such as downward causation, catalysts, complex loops, and causal mechanisms are used.

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