Mind 106 (422):263-277 (1997)
On David Lewis's original analysis of causation, c causes e only if c is linked to e by a chain of distinct events such that each event in the chain (counter-factually) depends on the former one. But this requirement precludes the possibility of late pre-emptive causation, of causation by fragile events, and of indeterministic causation. Lewis proposes three different strategies for accommodating these three kinds of cases, but none of these turn out to be satisfactory. I offer a single analysis of causation that resolves these problems in one go but which respects Lewis's initial insights. One distinctive feature of my account is that it accommodates indeterministic causation without resorting to probabilities.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Natural-Born Deterministe: A New Defense of Causation as Probability-Raising.Robert Northcott - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (1):1 - 20.
Reversing the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation.Alex Broadbent - 2007 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (2):169 – 189.
Similar books and articles
Causal Condition, Causal Asymmetry, and the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation.Jig-Chuen Lee - 1986 - Synthese 67 (2):213 - 223.
Keeping Track of the Time: Emending the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation.L. A. Paul - 1998 - Analysis 58 (3):191–198.
A Counterfactual Analysis of Indeterministic Causation.Murali Ramachandran - 2004 - In J. Collins, E. J. Hall & L. A. Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. MIT Press.
Indeterminism, Counterfactuals, and Causation.Richard Otte - 1987 - Philosophy of Science 54 (1):45-62.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads158 ( #29,219 of 2,164,293 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #84,020 of 2,164,293 )
How can I increase my downloads?