A counterfactual analysis of causation

Mind 106 (422):263-277 (1997)
Abstract
On David Lewis's original analysis of causation, c causes e only if c is linked to e by a chain of distinct events such that each event in the chain (counter-factually) depends on the former one. But this requirement precludes the possibility of late pre-emptive causation, of causation by fragile events, and of indeterministic causation. Lewis proposes three different strategies for accommodating these three kinds of cases, but none of these turn out to be satisfactory. I offer a single analysis of causation that resolves these problems in one go but which respects Lewis's initial insights. One distinctive feature of my account is that it accommodates indeterministic causation without resorting to probabilities.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/106.422.263
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Structural Equations and Causation.N. Hall - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):109 - 136.
Reversing the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation.Alex Broadbent - 2007 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (2):169 – 189.

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