A counterfactual analysis of causation

Mind 106 (422):263-277 (1997)

Authors
Murali Ramachandran
University of Witwatersrand
Abstract
On David Lewis's original analysis of causation, c causes e only if c is linked to e by a chain of distinct events such that each event in the chain (counter-factually) depends on the former one. But this requirement precludes the possibility of late pre-emptive causation, of causation by fragile events, and of indeterministic causation. Lewis proposes three different strategies for accommodating these three kinds of cases, but none of these turn out to be satisfactory. I offer a single analysis of causation that resolves these problems in one go but which respects Lewis's initial insights. One distinctive feature of my account is that it accommodates indeterministic causation without resorting to probabilities.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/106.422.263
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References found in this work BETA

Causation.D. Lewis - 1973 - In Philosophical Papers Ii. Oxford University Press. pp. 159-213.
Lewis on Causal Dependence.Michael McDermott - 1995 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (1):129 – 139.
Counterfactuals. [REVIEW]William Parry - 1973 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 44 (2):278-281.

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Citations of this work BETA

Cause and Norm.Christopher Hitchcock & Joshua Knobe - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (11):587-612.
Structural Equations and Causation.N. Hall - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):109 - 136.
A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and 'Causation' by Omission.P. Dowe - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):216 – 226.

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