A Strawsonian Objection to Russell's Theory of Descriptions

Analysis 53 (4):209 - 212 (1993)
One of Strawson's objections to Russell's theory of descriptions is that what are intuitively natural and correct utterances of sentences involving incomplete descriptions come out false by RTD. Russellians have responded, not by challenging Strawson's view that these uses are natural and correct, but by embellishing RTD to accommodate these uses. I pursue an alternative line of attack: I argue that there are circumstances in which "we" would find utterances of such sentences unnatural and improper but "RTD" would sanction. So, RTD clashes with ordinary language, as Strawson suggests.
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DOI 10.1093/analys/53.4.209
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