Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):461-475 (2013)

Erick José Ramirez
Santa Clara University
Jesse Prinz's The Emotional Construction of Morals is an ambitious and intriguing contribution to the debate about the nature and role of emotion within moral psychology. I review Prinz's recent claims surrounding the nature of emotional concepts as ?embodied representations of concern? and survey his later arguments meant to establish a form of cultural relativism. Although I suggest that other theories of emotional representation (i.e. prototype views) would better serve Prinz's aims, the underlying meta-ethical relativism that results is well defended and represents a significant advance for constructivist Sentimentalists
Keywords Prinz  Emotion  Concepts  Prototype Theory  Basic Emotion
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DOI 10.1080/09515089.2012.673767
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Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.
Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1997 - Noûs 31 (4):528-537.

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