Distributed representation and causal modularity: A rejoinder to Forster and Saidel

Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):453-61 (1994)
Abstract
In “Connectionism and the fats of folk psychology”, Forster and Saidel argue that the central claim of Ramsey, Stich and Garon (1991)—that distributed connectionist models are incompatible with the causal discreteness of folk psychology—is mistaken. To establish their claim, they offer an intriguing model which allegedly shows how distributed representations can function in a causally discrete manner. They also challenge our position regarding projectibility of folk psychology. In this essay, I offer a response to their account and show how their model fails to demonstrate that our original argument was mistaken. While I will discuss several difficulties with their model, my primary criticism will be that the features of their model that are causally discrete are not truly distributed, while the features that are distributed are not really discrete. Concerning the issue of projectibility, I am more inclined to agree with Forster and Saidel and I offer a revised account of what we should have said originally
Keywords Connectionism  Folk  Psychology  Science  Forster, M  Saidel, E
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DOI 10.1080/09515089408573136
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References found in this work BETA
What is the'D'in'PDP': A Survey of the Concept of Distribution.Tim Van Gelder - 1991 - In William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. M. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Lawrence Erlbaum.
Representation in Connectionist Models.T. van Gelder - 1991 - In William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. M. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Lawrence Erlbaum.

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Citations of this work BETA
Networks with Attitudes.Paul Skokowski - 2007 - Artificial Intelligence and Society 22 (3):461-470.

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