Abstract
This article rebuts Ramsey's earlier theory, in 'Universals of Law and of Fact', of how laws of nature differ from other true generalisations. It argues that our laws are rules we use in judging 'if I meet an F I shall regard it as a G'. This temporal asymmetry is derived from that of cause and effect and used to distinguish what's past as what we can know about without knowing our present intentions.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 52,919
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

A Tale of Two Doctrines: Moral Encroachment and Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu - forthcoming - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Interpretations of Probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.

View all 137 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-09-14

Total views
513 ( #10,877 of 2,343,506 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
29 ( #23,474 of 2,343,506 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes