On restricting rigidity

Mind 101 (401):141-144 (1992)
In this note I revive a lingering (albeit dormant) account of rigid designation from the pages of Mind with the aim of laying it to rest. Why let a sleeping dog lie when you can put it down? André Gallois (1986) has proposed an account of rigid designators that allegedly squares with Saul Kripke’s (1980) characterisation of them as terms which designate the same object in all possible worlds, but on which, contra Kripke, identity sentences involving rigid designators may be merely contingently true. This suits Gallois, as he finds the notion of contingent identity coherent. Thus, the thrust of Gallois’ thesis is that his account of rigidity is preferable to Kripke’s because his accommodates a coherent metaphysical viewpoint, whereas Kripke’s doesn’t. Gallois has thwarted one unconvincing challenge (see Carter 1987; Gallois 1988) and his account, as yet, remains untainted. But not for long, I hope.1 Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the notion of contingent identity is coherent, that, in other words, it makes—or can make—sense to say that certain (possible) objects are identical in one world but distinct in another. What I shall argue here is that Gallois’ account of rigidity would prevent us from expressing the contingent nonidentity of objects; if so, this is a significant failing of the account, for, as it will emerge, clearly Gallois is committed to the contingency of non-identity
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/mind/101.401.141
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,769
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Rigidity, Natural Kind Terms, and Metasemantics.Corine Besson - 2010 - In Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (eds.), The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds. Routledge. pp. 25--44.
A Semantic Account of Rigidity.Alan Sidelle - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 80 (1):69 - 105.
Rigidity and De Jure Rigidity.Mark Textor - 1998 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):45-59.
Rigidity, Occasional Identity and Leibniz' Law.Simon Langford & Murali Ramachandran - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (201):518-526.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

66 ( #78,522 of 2,158,887 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #193,044 of 2,158,887 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums