Cognition, biology and idealist philosophy

Abstract

The basic philosophy of mainstream biology, the philosophy of materialist realism, assumes the existence of a material world independent of human observation and cognition. The scientific study of cognition in the context of biology has, however, led to the result, that all our thoughts and cognitions, including the assumption of a material world, are dependent on our cognitive apparatus in its present stage of evolution. I think, this shows a contradiction within materialist philosophy, and I therefore find, it is impossible to make a contradiction-free account of cognition based on this philosophy. An account of natural science, biological evolution, and cognition based on an idealist philosophy is offered, and it is argued, that this account is free of contradictions. In the idealist philosophy "material objects" are regarded as concepts based on sensory experiences.

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