Luck, Propositional Perception, and the Entailment Thesis

Synthese 191 (6):1223-1247 (2014)
Authors
Christopher Ranalli
VU University Amsterdam
Abstract
Looking out the window, I see that it's raining outside. Do I know that it’s raining outside? According to proponents of the Entailment Thesis, I do. If I see that p, I know that p. In general, the Entailment Thesis is the thesis that if S perceives that p, S knows that p. But recently, some philosophers (McDowell 2002, Turri 2010, Pritchard 2011, 2012) have argued that the Entailment Thesis is false. On their view, we can see p and not know that p. In this paper, I argue that their arguments are unsuccessful.
Keywords Entailment Thesis  Seeing that P  Belief  Epistemic Luck  Barn cases  Perceptual Knowledge  Epistemic Perception  Objectual Perception
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-013-0323-z
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
``Knowledge as Credit for True Belief".John Greco - 2003 - In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Clarendon Press. pp. 111-134.

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Citations of this work BETA

Knowledge as a Non‐Normative Relation.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):190-222.
Epistemic and Non-Epistemic Theories of Remembering.Steven James - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly:109-127.

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