Revisionism, Scepticism, and the Non-Belief Theory of Hinge Commitments

Authors
Christopher Ranalli
VU University Amsterdam
Abstract
In his recent work, Duncan Pritchard defends a novel Wittgensteinian response to the problem of radical scepticism. The response makes essential use of a form of non-epistemicism about the nature of hinge commitments. According to non-epistemicism, hinge commitments cannot be known or grounded in rational considerations, such as reasons and evidence. On Pritchard’s version of non-epistemicism, hinge commitments express propositions but cannot be believed. This is the non-belief theory of hinge commitments. One of the main reasons in favour of NBT over rival anti-sceptical Wittgensteinian views is that it has less theoretical costs and revisionary consequences than its rivals. In this paper, I argue that NBT fares at least as bad as its rivals in terms of its theoretical costs and revisionism. In particular, I argue that NBT is inconsistent with certain cases of philosophical disagreement; that it faces worries with mental-state scepticism; and that it faces difficulties in explaining how we can represent ourselves as committed to hinge commitments.
Keywords Duncan Pritchard   Moore’s paradox   conceivability   hinge commitments   non-belief theory   philosophical disagreement  radical scepticism
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DOI 10.1163/22105700-20171272
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References found in this work BETA

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