Topoi 40 (5):983-998 (2018)

Christopher Ranalli
VU University Amsterdam
What is the nature of deep disagreement? In this paper, I consider two similar albeit seemingly rival answers to this question: the Wittgensteinian theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge propositions, and the fundamental epistemic principle theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over fundamental epistemic principles. I assess these theories against a set of desiderata for a satisfactory theory of deep disagreement, and argue that while the fundamental epistemic principle theory does better than the Wittgensteinian theory on this score, the fundamental epistemic principle theory nevertheless struggles to explain the variety of deep disagreement.
Keywords Deep disagreement  Fundamental epistemic principles  Hinge propositions  Wittgenstein  Normative disagreement  Metaphysical disagreement
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Reprint years 2021
DOI 10.1007/s11245-018-9600-2
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References found in this work BETA

Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
The Language of Morals.Richard Mervyn Hare - 1952 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.

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Citations of this work BETA

Deep Disagreement and Hinge Epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4975-5007.
Epistemic Injustice and Deepened Disagreement.T. J. Lagewaard - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1571-1592.

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