Analysis 39 (March):75-81 (1979)
A fundamental assumption of Alexius Meinong's 1904 Theory of Objects is the act-content-object analysis of psychological experiences. I suggest that Meinong's theory need not be based on this analysis, but that an adverbial theory might suffice. I then defend the adverbial alternative against an objection raised by Roderick Chisholm, and conclude by presenting an apparently more serious objection based on a paradox discovered by Romane Clark.
|Keywords||Adverbs Epistemology Object Meinong|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Citations of this work BETA
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