On cogito propositions

Philosophical Studies 29 (1):63-68 (1976)

Abstract

I argue that George Nakhnikian's analysis of the logic of cogito propositions (roughly, Descartes's 'cogito' and 'sum') is incomplete. The incompleteness is rectified by showing that disjunctions of cogito propositions with contingent, non-cogito propositions satisfy conditions of incorrigibility, self-certifyingness, and pragmatic consistency; hence, they belong to the class of propositions with whose help a complete characterization of cogito propositions is made possible.

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Author's Profile

William J. Rapaport
State University of New York, Buffalo

References found in this work

Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1974 - Clarendon Press.
Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible?D. M. Armstrong - 1963 - Philosophical Review 72 (4):417.
Incorrigibility as the Mark of the Mental.Richard Rorty - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (June):399-424.

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Citations of this work

Logical Foundations for Belief Representation.William Rapaport - 1986 - Cognitive Science 10 (4):371-422.
God and Cogito: Semen Frank on the Ontological Argument.Paweł Rojek - 2019 - Studies in East European Thought 71 (2):119-140.

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