Searle's experiments with thought

Philosophy of Science 53 (June):271-9 (1986)
Abstract
A critique of several recent objections to John Searle's Chinese-Room Argument against the possibility of "strong AI" is presented. The objections are found to miss the point, and a stronger argument against Searle is presented, based on a distinction between "syntactic" and "semantic" understanding.
Keywords Epistemology  Human  Machine  Understanding  Searle, J
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DOI 10.1086/289312
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Can Semantics Be Syntactic?Neal Jahren - 1990 - Synthese 82 (3):309-28.
Yes, She Was!William Rapaport - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (1):3-17.

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