Noûs 19 (2):255-271 (1985)
Terence Parsons's informal theory of intentional objects, their properties, and modes of predication does not adequately reflect ordinary ways of speaking and thinking. Meinongian theories recognizing two modes of predication are defended against Parsons's theory of two kinds of properties. Against Parsons's theory of fictional objects, I argue that no existing entities appear in works of fiction. A formal version of Parsons's theory is presented, and a curious consequence about modes of predication is indicated.
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Predication, Fiction, and Artificial Intelligence.William J. Rapaport - 1991 - Topoi 10 (1):79-111.
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