Evaluating Time-Continuous Action Alternatives from the Perspective of Negative Utilitarianism: a Layered Approach.

Proceedings of the GV-Conf 2013 (2013)

Abstract

A layered approach to the evaluation of action alternatives with continuous time for decision making under the moral doctrine of Negative Utilitarianism is presented and briefly discussed from a philosophical perspective.

Download options

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-05-03

Downloads
1,086 (#5,832)

6 months
45 (#18,691)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Erich Rast
New University of Lisbon

References found in this work

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1959 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.
Negative Utilitarianism.R. N. Smart - 1958 - Mind 67 (268):542-543.
The Precautionary Principle and the Concept of Precaution.Per Sandin - 2004 - Environmental Values 13 (4):461 - 475.

Add more references

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Rule Utilitarianism and Decision Theory.JohnC Harsanyi - 1977 - Erkenntnis 11 (1):25 - 53.
Utilitarianism: A Standard of Rightness or a Decision Procedure.Joon Ho Kang - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:221-228.
Decision-Value Utilitarianism.Wesley Cooper - 2008 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):39-50.
Infinite Utility: Anonymity and Person-Centredness.Peter Vallentyne - 1995 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3):413 – 420.
Revealed Preference and Expected Utility.Stephen A. Clark - 2000 - Theory and Decision 49 (2):159-174.
Utilitarianism.Kent E. Robson - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:355-360.
Utilitarianism and Infinite Utility.Peter Vallentyne - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):212 – 217.