Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3221-3227 (2015)

Joshua Rasmussen
Azusa Pacific University
I develop a new theory of times. I show how to analyze times as tenselessly describable “abstract” entities. Some philosophers make use of ersatz times, which are abstract entities such as maximal states of affairs that bear earlier than and later than relations to one another. Although these times are normally thought to exemplify A-properties that cannot be expressed in a purely tenseless language, I explain how a tenseless theory can accommodate abstract times. I do this by defending Rasmussen’s tenseless presentism against a recent objection, and getting on the table a new theory of time that combines eternalism with a B-series of genuine, abstract times. The result is a new way to think about a familiar category: time
Keywords Presentism  Tenseless  Eternalism  Times  A-theory  A-properties
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-015-0466-5
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 58,834
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Truth and Ontology.Trenton Merricks - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
A Future for Presentism.Craig Bourne - 2006 - Oxford University Press.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Presentism Remains.Jonathan Tallant - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):409-435.
The Unique Groundability of Temporal Facts.John Cusbert & Kristie Millier - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1).
The Unique Groundability of Temporal Facts.John Cusbert & Kristie Miller - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):410-432.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Real Times and Possible Worlds.Heather Dyke - 1998 - In Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), Questions of time and tense. Oxford University Press. pp. 93--117.
Why Does Time Pass?Bradford Skow - 2012 - Noûs 46 (2):223-242.
The New Tenseless Theory of Time: A Reply to Smith.L. Nathan Oaklander - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 58 (3):287 - 292.
On the Experience of Tenseless Time.L. Nathan Oaklander - 1993 - Journal of Philosophical Research 18:159-166.
Problems with the New Tenseless Theory of Time.Quentin Smith - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 52 (3):371 - 392.
Presentism, Eternalism, and the Triviality Problem.Jerzy Gołosz - 2013 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 22 (1):45-61.
Anselmian Eternalism.Katherin A. Rogers - 2007 - Faith and Philosophy 24 (1):3-27.
Tense and Truth Conditions.Michelle Beer - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (2):265-269.
Temporal Becoming and the Direction of Time.William Lane Craig - 1999 - Philosophy and Theology 11 (2):349-366.
Farewell to McTaggart’s Argument?Michael Tooley - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (2):243-255.


Added to PP index

Total views
104 ( #98,256 of 2,426,000 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #68,411 of 2,426,000 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes