Tenseless times

Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3221-3227 (2015)
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Abstract

I develop a new theory of times. I show how to analyze times as tenselessly describable “abstract” entities. Some philosophers make use of ersatz times, which are abstract entities such as maximal states of affairs that bear earlier than and later than relations to one another. Although these times are normally thought to exemplify A-properties that cannot be expressed in a purely tenseless language, I explain how a tenseless theory can accommodate abstract times. I do this by defending Rasmussen’s tenseless presentism against a recent objection, and getting on the table a new theory of time that combines eternalism with a B-series of genuine, abstract times. The result is a new way to think about a familiar category: time

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2015-03-11

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Joshua Rasmussen
Azusa Pacific University

Citations of this work

The Unique Groundability of Temporal Facts.John Cusbert & Kristie Miller - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):410-432.
The Unique Groundability of Temporal Facts.John Cusbert & Kristie Millier - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1).
Presentism and Times as Propositions.Luca Banfi & Daniel Deasy - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):725-743.
Presentism Remains.Jonathan Tallant - 2017 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):409-435.

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References found in this work

Truth and ontology.Trenton Merricks - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
A future for presentism.Craig Bourne - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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