Authors
Matthew Ratcliffe
University of York
Abstract
This paper sketches an account of what distinguishes emotional intentionality from other forms of intentionality. I focus on the ‘two-sided’ structure of emotional experience. Emotions such as being afraid of something and being angry about something involve intentional states with specific contents. However, experiencing an entity, event, or situation in a distinctively emotional way also includes a wider-ranging disturbance of the experiential world within which the object of emotion is encountered. I consider the nature of this disturbance and its relationship to the localized content of an emotional experience.
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DOI 10.1017/s1358246118000784
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References found in this work BETA

Emotions as Attitudes.Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (3):293-311.
What an Emotion Is: A Sketch.Robert C. Roberts - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (April):183-209.
Emotions as Evaluative Feelings.Bennett W. Helm - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):248--55.
Affective Intentionality and the Feeling Body.Jan Slaby - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):429-444.

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