Authors
Matthew Ratcliffe
University of York
Abstract
This paper disputes the claim that our understanding of others is enabled by a commonsense or ‘folk’ psychology, whose ‘core’ involves the attribution of intentional states in order to predict and explain behaviour. I argue that interpersonal understanding is seldom, if ever, a matter of two people assigning intentional states to each other but emerges out of a context of interaction between them. Self and other form a coupled system rather than two wholly separate entities equipped with an internalised capacity to assign mental states to the other. This applies even in those instances where one might seem to adopt a ‘detached’ perspective towards others. Thus ‘folk psychology’, as commonly construed, is not folk psychology
Keywords Cognition  Epistemology  Folk Psychology  Interaction  Intersubjectivity
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-005-9010-y
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References found in this work BETA

The Extended Mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.

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Citations of this work BETA

Seeing Mind in Action.Joel Krueger - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):149-173.
Theory-Theory and the Direct Perception of Mental States.Jane Suilin Lavelle - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2):213-230.
We Read Minds to Shape Relationships.Vivian Bohl - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (5):674-694.
Dynamic Embodied Cognition.Leon C. de Bruin & Lena Kästner - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):541-563.
Phenomenology of Social Cognition.Shannon Spaulding - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (5):1069-1089.

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