William James on emotion and intentionality

Authors
Matthew Ratcliffe
University of York
Abstract
William James's theory of emotion is often criticized for placing too much emphasis on bodily feelings and neglecting the cognitive aspects of emotion. This paper suggests that such criticisms are misplaced. Interpreting James's account of emotion in the light of his later philosophical writings, I argue that James does not emphasize bodily feelings at the expense of cognition. Rather, his view is that bodily feelings are part of the structure of intentionality. In reconceptualizing the relationship between cognition and affect, James rejects a number of commonplace assumptions concerning the nature of our cognitive relationship with the world, assumptions that many of his critics take for granted
Keywords Cognition  Emotion  Epistemology  Intentionality  James, William
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DOI 10.1080/09672550500080405
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References found in this work BETA

Being and Time.Martin Heidegger - 1962 - London: Scm Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Insights and Blindspots of the Cognitivist Theory of Emotions.A. Scarantino - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (4):729-768.
Getting Stuck: Temporal Desituatedness in Depression.Michelle Maiese - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):701-718.
How Can Emotions Be Both Cognitive and Bodily?Michelle Maiese - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):513-531.

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