Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):289 - 295 (2011)

Authors
Agustin Rayo
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
I will argue for localism about credal assignments: the view that credal assignments are well-defined only relative to suitably constrained sets of possibilities. I will motivate the position by suggesting that it is the best way of addressing a puzzle devised by Roger White
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DOI 10.1080/00048401003746009
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References found in this work BETA

Reason and the Grain of Belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.
How Degrees of Belief Reflect Evidence.James Joyce - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):153-179.
Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence.Roger White - 2009 - In T. Szabo Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 161-186.
Decision Theory as Philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):549-577.
Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence.Roger White - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3.

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Citations of this work BETA

Roger White’s Argument Against Imprecise Credences.Dylan Dodd - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):69-77.

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