Mind and Language 12 (3-4):475-89 (1997)
In his 1993 Nicod Lectures (The Elm & the Expert), Jerry Fodor proposed a solution to a certain version of the problem of 'inscrutability of reference', which problem poses a challenge to a certain naturalistic, computational approach to cognition which Fodor has favored. The problem is that a purely informational account of an agent's mental contents cannot discriminate meanings finely enough. Fodor proposes a strategy of solution which appeals to the inferential dispositions of agents to discriminate contents more finely. After a brief exposition of the problem and Fodor's bid for solution, I employ three counterexamples to argue that Fodor's proposal cannot succeed.
|Keywords||Cognition Computation Epistemology Language Reference Fodor, J|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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