Abstract

Famously, Saul Kripke proposes that there are contingent a priori truths, and has offered a number of examples to illustrate his claim. The most well-known example involves the standard meter bar in Paris. Purportedly, a certain agent knows a priori that the bar is one meter long. However, in response to a long-standing objection to such examples - the "existential complaint" - generally only modified examples having a conditional form are now considered candidates for the contingent a priori. Gareth Evans argues that these conditionals must be understood free-logically, and on this basis argues against Keith Donnellan's analysis of the contingent a priori. I show Evans' argument mistaken. I also take issue with the existential complaint, and suggest a way of understanding Kripke's original examples that is not subject to it. My approach focuses the debate in its right place, and allows us to take Kripke's original examples seriously.