Success by default?

Philosophia Mathematica 11 (3):305-322 (2003)
Abstract
I argue that Neo-Fregean accounts of arithmetical language and arithmetical knowledge tacitly rely on a thesis I call [Success by Default]—the thesis that, in the absence of reasons to the contrary, we are justified in thinking that certain stipulations are successful. Since Neo-Fregeans have yet to supply an adequate defense of [Success by Default], I conclude that there is an important gap in Neo-Fregean accounts of arithmetical language and knowledge. I end the paper by offering a naturalistic remedy.
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DOI 10.1093/philmat/11.3.305
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Neo-Fregean Ontology.Matti Eklund - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):95–121.
A Trivialist's Travails†. [REVIEW]Thomas Donaldson - 2014 - Philosophia Mathematica 22 (3):380-401.
A Trivialist's Travails.Thomas Donaldson - 2014 - Philosophia Mathematica 22 (3):380-401.

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