Some experienced qualities belong to the experience

Authors
Paul Raymont
University of Toronto (PhD)
Abstract
In this paper, a criticism of representationalist views of consciousness is developed. These views are often supported by an appeal to a transparency thesis about conscious states, according to which an experience does not itself possess the qualities of which it makes one conscious. The experience makes one conscious of these qualities by representing them, not by instantiating them. Against this, it is argued that some of the properties of which one is conscious are had by the conscious state itself. Only by adopting this view can we account for certain perceptual incompatibilities, such as the fact that one cannot see a stick as being both bent and not bent. This sort of experience is impossible because it would require that an experience have, and not just represent, incompatible features. [Presented at the APA Eastern Div mtg in NY in 2005]
Keywords transparency  representationism  consciousness
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Experience and Self-Consciousness.Joseph K. Schear - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):95 - 105.
From Panexperientialism to Conscious Experience: The Continuum of Experience.Gregory M. Nixon - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 1 (3):216-233.
A Critique of Dretske's Conception of State Consciousness.A. Minh Nguyen - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):187-206.
Sense-Data.Paul Coates - 2007 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Conscious Experience Versus Conscious Thought.Peter Carruthers - 2005 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Reference. MIT Press.
Subjective Experience and Points of View.Robert Francescotti - 1993 - Journal of Philosophical Research 18:25-36.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
181 ( #30,810 of 2,268,045 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #66,797 of 2,268,045 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature