Tye's criticism of the knowledge argument

Dialogue 34 (4):713-26 (1995)

Abstract

A defense of Frank Jackson's knowledge argument from an objection raised by Michael Tye , according to which Mary acquires no new factual knowledge when she first sees red but, instead, merely comes to know old facts in a new way

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Paul Raymont
University of Toronto (PhD)

References found in this work

Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Logic and Knowledge.BERTRAND RUSSELL - 1957 - Philosophical Quarterly 7 (29):374.
Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia.Terence E. Horgan - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (April):147-52.
The Metaphysics of Mind.W. D. Hart - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (159):255-257.

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