Human rights without foundations

In J. Tasioulas & S. Besson (eds.), The Philosphy of International Law. Oxford University Press (2010)

Authors
Joseph Raz
Columbia University
Abstract
Using the accounts of Gewirth and Griffin as examples, the article criticises accounts of human rights as those are understood in human rights practices, which regard them as rights all human beings have in virtue of their humanity. Instead it suggests that (with Rawls) human rights set the limits to the sovereignty of the state, but criticises Rawls conflation of sovereignty with legitimate authority. The resulting conception takes human rights, like other rights, to be contingent on social conditions, and in particular on the nature of the international system.
Keywords human rights
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What Is Special About Human Rights?Christian Barry & Nicholas Southwood - 2011 - Ethics and International Affairs 25 (3):369-83.
Reconceptualizing Human Rights.Marcus Arvan - 2012 - Journal of Global Ethics 8 (1):91-105.
Human Rights and the Minimally Good Life.Nicole Hassoun - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (3):413-438.

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