In J. Tasioulas & S. Besson (eds.), The Philosphy of International Law. Oxford University Press (2010)
AbstractUsing the accounts of Gewirth and Griffin as examples, the article criticises accounts of human rights as those are understood in human rights practices, which regard them as rights all human beings have in virtue of their humanity. Instead it suggests that (with Rawls) human rights set the limits to the sovereignty of the state, but criticises Rawls conflation of sovereignty with legitimate authority. The resulting conception takes human rights, like other rights, to be contingent on social conditions, and in particular on the nature of the international system.
Similar books and articles
Are human rights essentially triggers for intervention?John Tasioulas - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (6):938-950.
Human Rights in Cuba, El Salvador, and Nicaragua: A Sociological Perspective on Human Rights Abuse.Mayra Gómez - 2003 - Routledge.
The Challenge of Human Rights: Origin, Development and Significance.John Mahoney - 2006 - Blackwell.
Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Appeal to Separate the Conjoined Twins.Doris Schroeder - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (3):323-335.
The Concept of Rights in Contemporary Human Rights Discourse.Christine Chwaszcza - 2010 - Ratio Juris 23 (3):333-364.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
What Is Special About Human Rights?Christian Barry & Nicholas Southwood - 2011 - Ethics and International Affairs 25 (3):369-83.
The force of the claimability objection to the human right to subsistence.Jesse Tomalty - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):1-17.
Avoiding Cultural Imperialism in the Human Right to Health.Kathryn Muyskens - 2021 - Asian Bioethics Review 14 (1):87-101.
References found in this work
No references found.