Human rights without foundations

In J. Tasioulas & S. Besson (eds.), The Philosphy of International Law. Oxford University Press (2010)
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Abstract

Using the accounts of Gewirth and Griffin as examples, the article criticises accounts of human rights as those are understood in human rights practices, which regard them as rights all human beings have in virtue of their humanity. Instead it suggests that (with Rawls) human rights set the limits to the sovereignty of the state, but criticises Rawls conflation of sovereignty with legitimate authority. The resulting conception takes human rights, like other rights, to be contingent on social conditions, and in particular on the nature of the international system.

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2009-01-28

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Joseph Raz
Columbia University

Citations of this work

What Is Special About Human Rights?Christian Barry & Nicholas Southwood - 2011 - Ethics and International Affairs 25 (3):369-83.
Human Rights and the Minimally Good Life.Nicole Hassoun - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (3):413-438.
Group Rights.Peter Jones - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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