In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press (2009)
The paper argues that normative reasons are of two fundamental kinds, practical which are value related, and adaptive, which are not related to any value, but indicate how our beliefs and emotions should adjust to fit how things are in the world. The distinction is applied and defended, in part through an additional distinction between standard and non-standard reasons (for actions, intentions, emotions or belief).
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Value and the Regulation of the Sentiments.Justin D'Arms - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):3-13.
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