Reasons : Practical and adaptive

In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press (2009)
Abstract
The paper argues that normative reasons are of two fundamental kinds, practical which are value related, and adaptive, which are not related to any value, but indicate how our beliefs and emotions should adjust to fit how things are in the world. The distinction is applied and defended, in part through an additional distinction between standard and non-standard reasons (for actions, intentions, emotions or belief).
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Citations of this work BETA
A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.
Subjective Reasons.Eric Vogelstein - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):239-257.
Reasons and Impossibility.Ulrike Heuer - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):235 - 246.
Value and the Regulation of the Sentiments.Justin D'Arms - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):3-13.

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