Hili Razinsky
Universidade de Lisboa
Ambivalence of desire and action in light of it are ordinary human engagements and yet received conceptions of desire and action deny that such action is possible. This paper contains an analysis of the possibility of fertile ambivalent compromises conjointly with a reconstruction of (Davidsonian) basic rationality and of action-desire relations. It is argued that the Aristotelian practical syllogism ought not to be conceived as paralysing the ambivalent agent. The practical syllogism makes compromise behaviour possible, including compromise action in the strong sense of acting to satisfy both of one's contrary desires at once. One's action can to a certain extent fulfil both desires by not exactly satisfying either. In showing this, attitudes including desires are analysed in terms of a soft identity, according to which they are both defined by concrete interlinkages with other attitudes and actual and possible behaviour, and transcend any such connections. In particular, not only do desires have a range, but rather the relation of desire and fulfilment is such that to want something allows a wider range as to what counts as fulfilment.
Keywords ambivalence  desires  philosophy of action  mental attitudes  agency  practical conflicts  the practical syllogism  practical rationality  Wittgenstein  basic rationality
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DOI 10.1080/02580136.2015.1010136
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References found in this work BETA

Love's Knowledge.Richard Eldridge - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):485-488.
Motivated Irrationality.D. F. Pears & David Pugmire - 1982 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 56:157-196.
In Defense of Ambivalence and Alienation.Logi Gunnarsson - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (1):13-26.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Live Language: Concreteness, Openness, Ambivalence.Hili Razinsky - 2015 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):51-65.

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