A Response to Swinburne's Latest Defense of the Argument For Dualism

Faith and Philosophy 16 (1):90-97 (1999)
This paper responds to Swinburne’s recent article “Dualism Intact,” which defends his argument for a body/soul dualism. It pays particular attention to his defense against the charges of Alston and Smythe, especially the appeal to the “quasi-Aristotelian assumption,” on which the essence of a thing is necessary to its being the thing that it is. I argue that this defense does not save the argument, but only makes clear that its apparent plausibility rests on an ambiguity between two understandings of the nature of logical possibility. Swinburne’s argument draws on and requires both understandings at different points in his argument, but the two are incompatible at the key point
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy and Religion
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ISBN(s) 0739-7046
DOI 10.5840/faithphil19991618
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