Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):419 – 430 (1993)
This paper surveys some themes of Allison's Kant's Theory of Freedom, and then raises a problem for his presentation of Kant's Reciprocity Thesis. Allison argues that a transcendentally free agent is bound to the moral law as follows. Rational agents fall under a justification requirement, and when transcendental freedom is added to the concept of rational agency, the justification requirement extends to the choice of fundamental maxims. Since facts about one's nature cannot justify the adoption of fundamental maxims, all that remains are considerations that anyone can recognize as valid. Thus a transcendentally free agent must conform to unconditional laws. The problem is that it is unclear how a transcendentally free agent can make a reasoned choice of fundamental principles; but if it can, why can't it choose the Principle of Happiness? I suggest that a stronger version of this argument results from adopting a richer notion of a transcendentally free agent as an autonomous sovereign will with an interest in expressing its sovereignty
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Causality and Critical Theory: Nature's Order in Adorno, Cartwright and Bhaskar.Craig Reeves - 2009 - Journal of Critical Realism 8 (3):316-342.
Similar books and articles
The Moral Law as Causal Law.Robert N. Johnson - 2009 - In Jens Timmermann (ed.), Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press.
Allison on Rational Agency.Stephen Engstrom - 1993 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):405 – 418.
Locke on the Freedom of the Will.Vere Chappell - 1994 - In G. A. J. Rogers (ed.), Locke's Philosophy: Content and Context. Oxford University Press. pp. 101--21.
Kant's Theory of Freedom.Jonathan Bennett - 1984 - In Allen W. Wood (ed.), Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy. Cornell University Press.
The Problem of Agency and the Problem of Accountability in Kant's Moral Philosophy.Iuliana Corina Vaida - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):110-137.
The Folk Psychology of Free Will: Fits and Starts.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (5):473-502.
Freedom and the Human Sciences: Hume’s Science of Man Versus Kant’s Pragmatic Anthropology.Thomas Sturm - 2011 - Kant Yearbook 3 (1):23-42.
Added to index2009-02-04
Total downloads23 ( #219,657 of 2,171,746 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #326,702 of 2,171,746 )
How can I increase my downloads?