Logical consequence as truth-preservation

Logique and Analyse 183 (4):479-493 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX


t is often suggested that truth-preservation is insufficient for logical consequence, and that consequence needs to satisfy a further condition of relevance. Premises and conclusion in a valid consequence must be relevant to one another, and truth-preservation is too coarse-grained a notion to guarantee that. Thus logical consequence is the intersection of truth-preservation and relevance. This situation has the absurd consequence that one might concede that the conclusion of an argument was true (since the argument had true premises and was truth-preserving); yet should refuse to infer the conclusion from the premises, in the absence of demonstration of the relevance of the premises to the conclusion. The error lies in giving insufficient attention to the notion of truth-preservation. Relevance is no separable ingredient in the analysis of logical consequence, but a necessary condition of it. What we show is that if an argument really is truth-preserving, then that in itself is enough to show that the premises are (logically) relevant to the conclusion.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,261

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Multiple Conclusions.Greg Restall - 2005 - In Petr Hájek, Luis Valdés-Villanueva & Dag Westerståhl (eds.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. College Publications.
The T-schema is not a logical truth.R. T. Cook - 2012 - Analysis 72 (2):231-239.
``Fatalism and the Omnitemporality of Truth".Richard L. Purtill - 1988 - Faith and Philosophy 5 (2):185-192.
Fatalism and the Omnitemporality of Truth.Richard L. Purtill - 1988 - Faith and Philosophy 5 (2):185-192.
Ray on Tarski on logical consequence.William H. Hanson - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (6):605-616.
Logical pluralism and the preservation of warrant.Greg Restall - 2004 - In S. Rahman (ed.), Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 163--173.


Added to PP

62 (#261,426)

6 months
8 (#370,225)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Stephen Read
University of St. Andrews

Citations of this work

The philosophy of alternative logics.Andrew Aberdein & Stephen Read - 2011 - In Leila Haaparanta (ed.), The development of modern logic. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 613-723.
Single-Assumption Systems in Proof-Theoretic Semantics.Leonardo Ceragioli - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (5):1019-1054.
A verisimilitudinarian analysis of the Linda paradox.Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa - 2012 - VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosphy of Science.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Formal Logic.Arthur N. Prior & Norman Prior - 1955 - Oxford,: Oxford University Press.
Symbolic Logic.C. I. Lewis & C. H. Langford - 1932 - Erkenntnis 4 (1):65-66.
A Survey of Symbolic Logic.C. I. Lewis - 1918 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 17 (3):78-79.
Relevant deduction.Gerhard Schurz - 1991 - Erkenntnis 35 (1-3):391 - 437.
Formal Logic.A. N. Prior - 1964 - Studia Logica 15:298-301.

View all 24 references / Add more references