Monism: The One True Logic

In D. de Vidi & T. Kenyon (eds.), A Logical Approach to Philosophy: Essays in Memory of Graham Solomon. Springer (2006)

Authors
Stephen Read
University of St. Andrews
Abstract
Logical pluralism is the claim that different accounts of validity can be equally correct. Beall and Restall have recently defended this position. Validity is a matter of truth-preservation over cases, they say: the conclusion should be true in every case in which the premises are true. Each logic specifies a class of cases, but differs over which cases should be considered. I show that this account of logic is incoherent. Validity indeed is truth-preservation, provided this is properly understood. Once understood, there is one true logic, relevance logic. The source of Beall and Restall’s error is a recent habit of using a classical metalanguage to analyse non-classical logics generally, including relevance logic.
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References found in this work BETA

Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.
Negation in Relevant Logics (How I Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love the Routley Star).Greg Restall - 1999 - In Dov M. Gabbay & Heinrich Wansing (eds.), What is Negation? Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 53-76.
Carnap’s Tolerance, Meaning, and Logical Pluralism.Greg Restall - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (8):426 - 443.
Defending Logical Pluralism.J. C. Beall & Greg Restall - 2001 - In Logical Consequence: Rival Approaches. Stanmore: Hermes. pp. 1-22.

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):631-658.
Rivalry, Normativity, and the Collapse of Logical Pluralism.Erik Stei - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):411-432.
Logical Pluralism, Meaning-Variance, and VerbalDisputes.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):355-373.

View all 19 citations / Add more citations

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